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Guest Editorial: Rethinking Genocide, Mass Atrocities, and
Political Violence in Africa
Are conflicts dynamic processes? Though seemingly answered with a simple yes, the
tendency at times to analyze and thereafter market complex conflict processes based on discrete
categories of violence exposes a shortcoming in current analyses of conflict throughout the African
continent. This not only suggests the need to problematize the very analytical frames employed
to understand conflicts and how we respond to violence, but also interrogate why certain frames
are applied selectively despite cross case similarities or why particular violence metanarratives are
superimposed on conflict dynamics with little regard for how subnational processes may “map
onto” or undermine macro conflict dynamics over time.1 While conflict framing is critical for
building and developing theory as well as informing conflict prevention and resolution strategies,
it has the potential to narrow our vision, obscuring the evolving nature of conflicts, and impeding
peacebuilding efforts. Concealing pertinent factors driving conflict may not be the only unintended
consequence of conflict framing. Perhaps more pressingly, the way in which conflict and violence
are framed, and the approaches taken, thereafter, may function to facilitate violence escalation
rather than mitigation. This poses a critical challenge to scholars and practitioners studying political
violence.
In spite of an initial downward trend in political violence in the form of internal armed
conflict to capture control of the state and replace incumbent governments, and an increase in
varying levels of democratic governance on the continent throughout the beginning of the new
millennium,2 notable challenges persist as others have increased in significance. Of note is not only
the shift over the past ten years of this downward trend in violent armed conflict in the opposite
direction, but how this shift has been coupled with a revival and evolution of violence in African
states from Central African Republic to Mali to Libya, and elsewhere with links to past occurrences
of instability and insurgency.3 Manifestations of political violence in the form of electoral violence,
riots, repression, and various forms of lethal economic predation remain. What cannot be overlooked
when discussing the dynamics of violence in each of these cases however, as in many others, is the
matter of varying external and militarized forms of intervention in each of their histories (on Libya,
see Kuperman, this issue). Nor can we overlook the ambiguity that can exist between peace and
wartime contexts within the same country case. As such, it is not only important to consider the
socio-economic and political processes fostering a resurgence and evolution of violence, but to do
this in a way that is neither blind to nor blinded by history.4 (See Purdeková, this issue). Relatedly,
the continued presence, yet increasingly diverse conglomeration of violent nonstate actors on the
continent from Nigeria, to Somalia, to DRC, and elsewhere has been connected to an upward trend
in transborder conflict and violence.5 While these sub-state armed entities move cross border from
statal peripheral areas for a variety of reasons from securing material resources from financing to
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support, what is apparent is the devastating effects on civilians. From the effects of transborder
violence more generally and direct targeting more specifically, militarized statal responses to
certain non-state agents have also had devastating and lasting consequences (see Loadenthal, this
issue). While identity variables from ethnicity to religion continue to be relevant in analyses of
conflict and violence, with some pointing to the increased importance of religion in conjunction
with the activities of certain non-state armed actors,6 others point to the increasing significance
of violence throughout the continent emanating from farmer-pastoralists dynamics.7 Lastly, from
Algeria to Sudan most recently, the African continent as a whole is witnessing an increasing rate
of nonviolent uprisings, successfully deposing of entrenched authoritarian regimes. As scholars
of civil resistance have suggested and, particularly in reference to Sudan, where international
indictments for mass violence and arrest warrants failed, mass mobilization triumphed in unseating
a brutal leader.8
Yet, it is against this backdrop of some of these emerging trends across the continent that the
term “genocide” has also been employed to characterize violence or the risk of violence in Sudan,
South Sudan, Central African Republic, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Burundi. In
addition to considering the applicability of the genocide frame, we must also ask if the application
of the word genocide to understand political violence has been more of a help or a hindrance
to conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts in these countries? Has the word genocide overemphasized the role of identity and, particularly ethnicity and religion in conflict, concealing the
role of powerful international actors or structural drivers of conflict in each of these cases? Has
the word genocide concealed conflicts over governance, and access to economic opportunities and
resources? Does the focus on sovereign actors obscure the roles played by local, non-state, and
transnational actors in the production of violence?
Relatedly, terms such as atrocity crimes and the responsibility to protect were developed
purposefully over the last decade to downplay the implications of terms such as genocide and
crimes against humanity, and shift international political discourse from one of “prevention as
intervention” to a positive discourse of “prevention as a responsibility.” How have these concepts
shifted our frames of reference, in terms of practice, politics, and scholarship? And what has been
the impact, if any, of this shift? Has the Rule of Law, Responsibility to Protect, and Early Warning
and Early Prevention movements helped foster peace, or have they deflected blame from powerful
global actors to local actors? Elsewhere the labels of “extremism” and “terrorism” have been
applied by international observers and national governments in Nigeria, Libya, Tunisia, Uganda,
Somalia, Mali, and elsewhere. Have these concepts served to facilitate or hinder peace efforts
in these countries? Have the descriptors of “violent extremism” and “terrorism” created a false
narrative that these dynamics are characteristics of African conflicts and their conflict actors in
particular? Have these terms focused our analytical gaze on religion or ideology, while concealing
other important political and economic aspects of political struggles and conflict? In other words,
does labeling an actor a “terrorist” or extremist” depoliticize their actions and reify a category that
makes conflict resolution more difficult.
Genocide, (Political) Violence, and Conflict
Genocide and conflict, or more specifically varying forms of political violence have been increasingly
brought into conversation theoretically. Scholars have not merely sought to understand the
differences, but also the nexus between these forms of large-scale violence. To that effect, studies
have examined the occurrence of genocide against the backdrop of war and developed cross-case,
multi-leveled comparisons of genocide and likely genocidal violence to expose critical mechanisms
6
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of restraint and escalation. Elsewhere, examinations of multi-party conflicts have pointed to a
connection between negotiating peace in the context of multi-party civil wars and escalation toward
genocide as mediated by a large number of negotiating veto players.9 Notwithstanding these
theoretical advancements in our understanding of the logic of contemporary genocidal violence, in
many ways, the concept of genocide does not provide a helpful analytical frame for understanding
the dynamics of violent conflict in African contexts. Part of the reason for this is the term is often
used in highly politicized discourses around issues of naming and responding to political violence.
And, when applied, genocide determinations can serve to shape conflict analyses and what is
understood to be evolving on the ground rather than the reverse. That is -still embedded within
the concept of genocide, then, is a logic predetermining our understanding of the genesis and
motivation for violence, the protagonists and their (absolute) agency (or lack thereof), and the
ultimate trajectory and necessary means of action.
Of note in this regard is Dirk Moses’ work that speaks of a continued oversimplification
in how mass violence is conceptualized and analyzed.10 Citing the interconnected intellectual
development of Holocaust studies and Genocide Studies respectively, Moses points to the way
in which the concept of genocide was gradually reframed in the image of the Holocaust as a strict
policy of mass killing enacted by a totalitarian or authoritarian state and propelled exclusively by
an exclusionary (identity centric) ideology.11 By extension, non-genocidal occurrences of extreme
violence are understood more conventionally as inherently political, fought over tangible concerns
(access to land, resources, power), and violence is more restrained than absolute.12 Conceptually
framed as such, genocidal violence is at once decontextualized and a-political.13 Moreover, when
the motivating logic of genocidal violence is anchored within specific regime types and their
associated ideologies, as Irvin-Erickson observes, this serves to anchor the occurrence of genocide
exclusively (and erroneously) “within unfamiliar non-western, non-liberal, or non-democratic
ideologies.”14 The application of this genocide frame to the violence in Darfur, Sudan in the 2000s
served to shape analyses toward a singular focus on the state, obscuring the micropolitics and
dynamics of the genocidal violence. As such, policy and advocacy discussions over the violence in
Darfur, Moses writes, “were preoccupied with the Islamism of the Khartoum regime rather than
the logic of counter-insurgency and civil war, a potential in all societies.”15
It is from here that the nexus between violence and issues of actor and agency are influenced by
these assumptions embedded in this framing of genocide. More specifically, homogenized portrayals
9
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of the perpetrator group and the victim group are pervasive discourses around contemporary cases
of mass violence. Further still, narratives encompassing genocide framings can operate to label the
perpetrator social group as collectively evil, while the victim group is moralized collectively as
good.16 The logic of genocide labeling processes encompassing these binaries is, therefore, largely
for the purpose of generating a specific course of political action to prevent or mitigate genocidal
violence, namely, interventionism17 It was this course of action that was ultimately the desired end
of the advocacy campaigning on the violence in Darfur through the Save Darfur movement.18 The
application of the genocide descriptor uncritically by those associated with the campaign along
with scholar-practitioners and journalists reduced the Darfur conflict theatre and complex politics
of violence to a “primordial struggle”19 between two monolithic identity groups with ‘Arabs’
occupying the role of perpetrator and collectively “demonized” and ‘Africans’ occupying the role of
victim.20 As a consequence, this framing inaccurately portrayed social groups in Darfur (as would
be the case elsewhere) as unified collectives and ignored the shifting and diverse roles individuals
from within these social identity groups had in relation to violence. Moreover, as Mamdani
further highlights, it also critically served to obscure the contentious politics around belonging in
Sudan and claims embedded in struggles over how meaning is made of these identities.21 Beyond
Darfur, Irvin-Erickson has observed similar discursive frames employed in debates in the United
States over the genocidal violence of Islamic State and how to respond.22 Taken together, labeling
violence as genocide, therefore, is not an analytically neutral act, but rather takes a position in a
particular conflict suggesting discourses on genocide can play a generative role in conflict not only
from advocating military interventionism,23 but for how they have the potential to obscure the
micropolitics of violence, or, indeed, an entirely different violence trajectory (see Purdeková, this
issue).
Reverberations of simplistic perpetrator/victim binaries embedded in such framings of
genocidal violence are not bound by time but can have broader peacetime implications. The legacy
of crude, moralistic binaries embedded in central genocide studies narratives of the Rwandan
genocide that resulted from an analytical propensity toward prioritizing the 1994 genocide of the
Tutsi, Jones argues, have not merely afforded the Kagame administration political legitimacy. So
too have they insulated the government from international pressure over its record of perpetrating
past acts of mass violence and current human rights abuses.24 Compounding many of these issues,
Jones further observes, is a “pervasive sense of shame,” felt in Western capitals over international
political inaction in 1994.25 Elsewhere, in her examination of Rwandan state implemented policies to
promote national unity and reconciliation that have been much lauded internationally, Thompson
underscores the pervasive reach of state power into the lives of ordinary Rwandans, but also the
ways in which these same individuals subtly resist. By doing so, Thompson illustrates a critical
disconnect between what reconciliation policies are thought to be achieving on the ground and
what is actually transpiring.26
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The Responsibility to Protect
Adopted at the 2005 United Nations World Summit by heads of government and state, the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is the principle now most invoked in contemporary political
discourse, guiding how the international community perceives its commitment and response
to large scale violence.27 Culminating in the development of the R2P normative framework, the
intellectual history of reconceptualizing state sovereignty finds its roots in Africa and, particularly
over concerns around mass violence in southern Sudan and Khartoum’s unwillingness to act
on its responsibilities to its own people.28 It was from Francis Deng’s concerns here that he and
colleagues - Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild, and William Zartman – argued
for “sovereignty as responsibility.”29 State sovereignty, they argued, entailed obligations whereby
it is incumbent on sovereign states to domestically safeguard the welfare of all those living within
their territories.30 From its foundation in intellectual debates on sovereignty, the R2P norm,
thereafter, evolved through the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
in 200531 and, later, through the UN Secretary General’s report on the application of R2P.32 With
its evolution came a disaggregation of the notion of responsibility33 and a specification of broader
categories of violence incumbent upon states to prevent that importantly included genocide34 To
that effect, not only do individual states have a national responsibility to safeguard their domestic
populations from the threat and commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
and ethnic cleansing, so too do they have an international responsibility to ensure other sovereign
states work to fulfill their domestic obligations to protect their populations under R2P.35 Embedded
in the normative framework, therefore, is not only the notion of prevention and protection, at least
rhetorically, as collaboration, but also as one of responsibility.36
The shift in international political discourse from conceiving of mass violence prevention as
singularly done through military intervention to a more positive discourse on prevention through a
variety of mechanisms (non-militarized and militarized respectively) was much needed. However,
the political discourse and application of the R2P framework and, particularly the international
element of responsibility in contexts where it is perceived states are reneging on their sovereign
responsibilities has drawn sharp criticism. From voices in the global south arguing the imperialist
undertones of the framework divide the world between those states whose populations are secure
from mass violence and, therefore, concerns around their domestic responsibilities under R2P are
of little import, to those states innately incapable of safeguarding against mass violence and their
populations requiring external efforts, as a result, to protect them. To the global north where it is
argued the discourse around prevention as responsibility is not immune from likely exploitation by
powerful states seeking to simultaneously legitimize and detract attention from their interventionist
27

Philip Cunliffe, “Introduction: Critical Perspectives on R2P,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 4, no. 1 (March
2010), 35-37. DOI: 10.1080/17502970903541655
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political exploits abroad. 37 Others, (see Kuperman, this issue; see Idris Erameh, this issue) have
illustrated the devastating consequences of the uncritical application of R2P in complex wartime
contexts. Ultimately, the norm of R2P with its prioritization on state driven protection from mass
violence somewhat functions to conceal how we understand the nature of peace and, particularly
fostering sustainable peace. That is, rather than employing R2P in the pursuit of strengthening
state securitization whereby populations are repeatedly protected from mass violence, as IrvinErickson observes, the emphasis must be toward sovereignty as responsibility as embodied in state
institutions operating to preserve the safety of those within the territories of states.38 This is all
the more imperative given how central statal structures have been and will continue to be in the
commission of large-scale mass violence, including genocide.39
The Drivers of Conflict
Violent conflicts in Africa are largely driven by the same economic, political, and social forces as
conflicts elsewhere around the world. Yet, African states are among the newest in the world. We
know that poverty and conflict are correlated, and the continent is poor. As eluded to previously,
policy, advocacy, and media accounts emphasize various cultural attributes of conflict and mass
violence, often relying on long discredited notions of ancient tribal hatreds fueling violence while
ignoring the overwhelmingly peaceful interactions among ethnic groups.
The case of the Central African Republic (CAR) and the most recent increase in violence
toward the end of 2012 is illustrative not merely for its complexity, but also for the way in which
much of the violence has been portrayed as running almost exclusively along religious fault lines.
Determining whether the violence in the CAR is religious or not is largely unhelpful as is, in many
ways, the uncritical application of monolithic (monotheistic) religious descriptors to sub-state armed
elements and movements in the CAR. A simplistic, religiously dichotomous violence narrative of
Christians against Muslims obscures how religion, as a key element in the socio-political fabric
of the CAR, has long functioned within identity centric narratives over issues of belonging and
citizenship. So too can it function to divert attention away from seeking to understanding more
critically how religion has, in the case of the CAR and in other African conflict contexts, shaped
the dynamics of violence more overtly over time. Conflict de-escalatory and reconciliatory efforts
in the case of the CAR are needed to address both the overt and more historically discrete sociopolitical positioning of religion. 40
In sum, violent conflicts in Africa are at times protracted but what seemed like impossible
to resolve civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone or the struggles in Mozambique and Angola
have ended. Rather than thinking of “African Conflict” as a category containing various discrete
forms of political violence, it is more useful to recognize the micro-dynamics within each conflict.
By doing so, it becomes possible to analyze the complex socio-economic and political processes
through which violence evolves in diverse and varied ways. Without such an understanding of
the nature of conflicts in African contexts, analyses – academic or otherwise - will be stymied
by two-dimensional understandings of what is evolving on the ground. As a consequence, the
frameworks and policies adopted by various actors may do anything but mitigate conflict and
large-scale violence.

37

See, for example, Mahmood Mamdani, “Responsibility to Protect or Right to Punish?” in Critical Perspectives on the
Responsibility to Protect: Interrogating Theory and Practice, ed. Philip Cunliffe (London: Routledge, 2011), 125-138; on
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Potential in the Responsibility to Protect,” in Rethinking Security in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Edwin Daniel Jacob
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 105-123.

38
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Ibid., 121.
For the most comprehensive English language volume of the dynamics of violence in the Central African Republic see,
Tatiana Carayannis and Louisa Lombard, eds., Making Sense of the Central African Republic (London: Zed Books, 2015);
on religion and wartime violence in the CAR, see, Laura C. Collins, “Guns and Prayers: Religious Organisations and
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Rethinking Concepts, Deepening Scholarship
This special issue, “Rethinking Genocide, Mass Atrocities, and Political Violence in Africa: New
Directions, New Inquiries, and Global Perspectives” represents an attempt to critically investigate
the conceptual labels used to make meaning of conflicts across Africa. In doing so, this special issue
does not start from a position that assumes one form of conflict is inherent to the African continent or
that conflicts throughout Africa are uniform or unchanging. Nor is it understood that the continent
is uniquely inclined toward outbreaks of violent conflict or that when there is an outbreak of conflict
it is markedly different from how conflict and violence unfold elsewhere.41 Rather, it is premised
on an understanding that conflict and violence in Africa are often (and perhaps disproportionally)
conceptualized through the prism of terms as “genocide,” “civil war,” “mass atrocities,” “religious
violence,” “ethnic violence,” or “terrorism.” These frames serve to focus our analytical gaze on
society-wide or national level events and processes but conceal both the fine-grain local dynamics
of conflicts as well as the role of regional competitions, and transnational dynamics facilitated by
porous borders or diaspora communities. Within this context, the special issue asks whether the
traditional paradigms of understanding violence and peace, and how we seek to prevent, mitigate,
and resolve violence are still relevant to understanding conflict in African contexts.
To answer this call, the papers included in this special issue examine a variety of cases
throughout the African continent from Libya to Burundi and have been written from different
epistemological approaches and disciplinary backgrounds. Many of the contributions seek not
merely to critically analyze the application and applicability of conflict frames employed by
international observers and national governments, but also to examine the conceptual, theoretical,
and practical consequences of conflict framing on the politics of violence, conflict prevention and
mitigation, and peacebuilding efforts. Moreover, from negotiating peace to considerations of
amnesty, others critically engage these conventional conflict resolution approaches to end violence
and secure peace.
In her contribution opening this special issue, Andrea Purdeková seeks to further problematize
the notion of “preventive framing” and, specifically employing the genocide label as a mechanism
for prevention. Purdeková’s paper, “#StopThisMovie and the Pitfalls of Mass Atrocity Prevention:
Framing of Violence and Anticipation of Escalation in Burundi’s Crisis (2015-2017),” draws on a
wealth of data to trace how the recent dynamics of violence in Burundi and its escalation were
characterized for broad consumption using the genocide descriptor – explicitly and implicitly – for
the purposes of persuading, effecting, and ultimately to prompt interventionist preventive action.
Framed by an understanding of labeling is an essential element of conflict rather than a phenomenon
that operates above the conflict fray, Purdeková examines the unspoken and inadvertent
consequences of raising the specter of likely genocide in Burundi. Though activists may lament
the ultimate ineffectiveness of deploying the genocide frame to garner swift and decisive regional
or international preventive action, it was effective, Purdeková argues, in obscuring pertinent
variables undergirding violence and instability in Burundi, and the more likely and pressing
escalation trajectory toward civil war. Specifically, analyses tended toward drawing similarities
uncritically between Rwanda and Burundi’s pasts as determining the only likely trajectory to be
genocide. Consequently, while invoking the genocide frame overemphasized the role of ethnicity,
failure – at a result – to imagine or recognize an alternative possible trajectory for the crisis in
Burundi, Purdeková observes, was perhaps the most detrimental unintended consequences of how
the conflict was framed. Rather than mitigate abuses and deepening repression, determinations of
impending genocide facilitated a political standoff in which, Purdekovà argues, violence became
more hidden and organized. Moreover, a preoccupation with preventing an impending genocide,
in turn, prevented steps toward broader considerations of a political solution to the violence.
Compounding this was the way in which these uncritical determinations of the evolution of the
crisis contributed to the government turning inward and distancing itself from international
influence.
If Purdeková’s paper serves as a critical entry point to broader considerations of the unintended
consequences embedded in the preventive agenda, Alan Kuperman’s contribution takes this
41
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theme one step further by testing the moral hazard of humanitarian intervention hypothesis in
the Libyan case. In his, “Did R2P Foster War in Libya,” Kuperman examines the 2011 Libyan
uprising to explicate whether the decision to instigate, escalate, or sustain the rebellion was done
based on a belief held by those involved that a counteroffensive launched by the Qaddafi regime
would provoke an external humanitarian military intervention that would, in turn, advance their
revolutionary agenda. By tracing of the chronology of events and decisions made around the
instigation and perpetuation of the Libyan rebellion, Kuperman provides an alternative reading
of its onset. For Kuperman, the rebellion unfolded from the east and, particularly from preplanned violence perpetrated by Islamist militants in the region. This violence, Kuperman argues,
co-occurred with protest events in Benghazi rather than emerging in their wake as conventional
narrations suggest. Concurrently, Kuperman draws upon new documentary sources to reveal the
positions, interests, and ultimately illustrates the shifting strategic calculus of the rebel forces and,
particularly their leadership from the point of initiating rebellion to deciding to continue it. Taken
together, while it was self-belief alone in their ability to triumph over the Qaddafi regime that
propelled militants to initiate rebellion, external intervention was increasingly understood by their
leadership as essential for not merely the continuation of their struggle, but to facilitate an eventual
victory. Strong intimations in support of humanitarian military intervention given by NATO
members heightened the belief among the rebels that such assistance was not only a possibility,
but forthcoming. Rebel leadership, Kuperman further suggests, also attempted to actively court
such assistance by overstating the state-sponsored threats to civilians. With the eventual arrival
of the NATO-led intervention, the otherwise short-lived rebellion continued for several months.
Yet, violence escalated and the civilians the humanitarian military intervention had ostensibly
been launched to protect were subjected to widespread and persistent violence. The Libyan case,
Kuperman argues, is yet further evidence of the need to critically assess how R2P is approached
in order to grapple more seriously with moral hazard. Atrocity prevention, Kuperman concludes,
demands intervention strategies be informed and controlled.
Interwoven throughout the contributions offered by Purdeková and Kuperman is a
commitment to highlighting the complexity of the African wartime environment; a complexity
that is often at best obscured and at worse dismissed in favor of a tendency toward reductionist
and misleading portrayals of conflict dynamics, actors, and their interests much to the detriment
of civilian protection, mitigating violence, and fostering paths toward a cessation of hostilities
and peace. In doing so, they expose to varying degrees how the local matters and select actors in
conflicts are not passive recipients of frames employed by external agents in understanding their
context. It is not that Africans fight over different things than those in other parts of the world.
But deeply embedded assumptions generate analytical conclusions that often overlook political
dynamics and highlight identity, hence making genocide appear more likely.
Building on this, Nicolas Idris Erameh, in “The Practices, Pitfalls, and Prospects of the
Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) in Africa,” argues for more importance to be given to understanding
localized conflict dynamics and how R2P is understood locally in contexts where the R2P normative
framework is applied, and particularly prior to engaging in militarized forms of intervention
encompassed under the third pillar of the framework. Efforts, Idris Erameh argues, are required to
rethink the notion of last resort pertaining to militarized interventionism in conjunction with more
active and tangible engagement in the pursuit of political and diplomatic solutions for conflict
throughout the continent. The importance, Idris Erameh suggests, of developing more contextually
attuned understandings of conflict lies in the ability, thereafter, to shift discourse and action on
R2P in Africa from militarized to non-militarized mechanisms for prevention. Concurrently, Idris
Erameh contents the prospects of R2P in Africa demand a re-examination of what unfolds during
the interactions between those who intervene and those who are intervened upon. Specifically,
renewed considerations of the varying power dynamics between these parties are vital. In
consideration of the enduring issues of power embedded in discourses surrounding R2P and,
particularly at the level of practice, Idris Erameh not merely underscores the relative and continued
marginalization of African states in vital decision-making processes and measures taken under the
auspice of R2P, but also the manner in which past intervening states have appeared unencumbered
by the spirit of the framework. One possible solution, he suggests, lies in critically engaging the
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notion of “responsibility while protecting” and its associated elements of proportionality on the
part of states intervening militarily, on the one hand, and offsetting the implications of external
intervention, on the other.
Along with considerations of genocide framing and the responsibility to protect, other
contributors to this special issue engage the framing politics of terrorism. Michael Loadenthal,
in “Othering Terrorism: A Rhetorical Strategy of Strategic Labeling,” turns our attention to
rhetorical processes of othering as captured through an examination of print and film media
coverage. The analysis draws upon the film, Black Hawk Down, media reports of Boko Haram
in Nigeria, non-state media productions generated by actors such as Al-Shabab in Somalia, and
rightist violence. Loadenthal illustrates how framings of political violence and, particularly
‘terrorism,’ acts of ‘terroristic’ violence, and whom is considered to be a ‘terrorist,’ vary sharply
from those surrounding notions of ‘extremism’ and ‘extremists.’ Specifically, Loadenthal
contends that through the production and reproduction of discourse, notions of ‘terrorism’ are
constructed in such a way whereby they are deeply tied to notions of foreign, non-white and,
non-western identities. Conversely, white, Christian actors operate outside of these discursive
frames of othering, and rightist violence committed by these actors are omitted from ‘terrorism’
determinations. Framing violence as ‘terroristic,’ Loadenthal illustrates, has little to do with the
tactics employed by sub-state entities. Loadenthal then connects these observations over how
political violence and, particularly terrorism is framed to broader issues of denials of political
legitimacy and empathy. The descriptor ‘terrorist’ applied to brown and black bodies lends
legitimacy to state-enacted mass violence while the lives of persons marked as terrorists are
deemed unmournable and ultimately disposable. Loadenthal concludes that these racialized
discourses of otherness will continue to be used to justify state violence until we are able to
extend dignity, legitimacy, and empathy to armed resisters around the world.
Turning to the Nigerian case specifically, Chinonye Alma Outonye’s contribution, “The Fight
for Language: An Exploration of the Nigerian State’s Response to Protest Groups in Southeastern
Nigeria,” examines how a state’s use of language and, specifically categorizing certain forms of
collective action subversive, acts as a strategy through which to dominate and discredit certain
groups’ grievances within wider public discourse. The Nigerian state, Outonye argues, cloak
their rational for deploying direct violence against resurgent pro-Biafra movements in security
imperatives and, particularly arguments couched in their legitimate right to use force to defend
against perceived threats to the territorial integrity of the state. Within this framework, linguistic
determinations of these movements as ‘extremists’ and ‘terrorists’ serve to position them
and their demands as irrational and illegitimate. Nigerian state-sponsored violence in Biafra,
thereafter, is at once rationalized and normalized. This labeling strategy not merely shapes how
these protest groups experience state violence, but, as Outonye contends, such determinations
also function to disconnect these movements from their local context and, in turn, the broader
issues undergirding their emergence. Further still, given the perceived illegitimacy of these
movements, such labels work to obscure a range of possible alternative mechanisms, including
dialogue in preference for violence to address pro-Biafra movements. Taken together, Outonye
critically illustrates how the strategic application of these labels by the Nigerian state not only
obfuscates the legacy of the Nigeria-Biafra war on the Eastern region, including persistent
marginalization and discrimination, but the entrenched lack of addressing the history of the war.
By underscoring the importance of bringing Nigeria’s past into conversation with understanding
the present, Outonye provides a deeper understanding of the intricacies of the contemporary
Nigeria landscape, which are hidden behind tactics of dismissal and violence employed by
the state. The latter of which serves to both deepen tensions and feeds the central freedom and
recognition by secession narrative of these movements.
Moving to considerations of how peace is approached, Nathaniel Dominic Danjibo and
Owonikoko Babajide Saheed’s contribution, “Buying Peace or Building Peace: Rethinking
Non-Coercive Approaches to the Management of Non-state Armed Groups Involved in Mass
Atrocities,” examines the contentious issue of amnesty in conflict contexts. Drawing upon the
case of the Nigerian state-sponsored amnesty program implemented in the Niger Delta, Danjibo
and Owonikoko illustrate how the use of this particular strategy to address the existence and
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activities of non-state armed actors, and their associated violence served as little more than a
mechanism to placate violent agents. Much of the failure of the amnesty program, the authors
contend, can be attributed to the way in which this approach was not embedded in a larger process
toward peace embarked upon by the state in conjunction with armed nonstate actors in the Delta.
Specifically, despite the inclusion of a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration component,
there was neither an initiation of dialogue nor broader considerations of either the structural
violence propelling instability in the Delta, or the legacy of the direct violence perpetrated by both
the state and non-state armed groups. Bringing the lessons of granting amnesty in the Niger Delta
into conversation with the conflict context in North East Nigeria, Danjibo and Owonikoko argue an
amnesty provision alone would be inadequate to bring an end to Boko Haram violence. Moreover,
as the authors highlight, questions persist as to whether the group’s leadership would be receptive
to amnesty. Rather, there is a need for more contextually attuned, non-violent strategies to building
peace in the region. This, for the authors, is part of a larger imperative to integrate peacebuilding
approaches into atrocity prevention efforts and negotiating peace – that is, there is a continued need
for holistic peacebuilding to promote sustainable peace in Nigeria and elsewhere on the continent.
From Nigeria to the Great Lakes region, Jonathan Belof and Samantha Lakin in, “Peace and
Compromise, Idealism and Constraint: The Case of the Arusha Peace Accords in Rwanda and
Burundi,” draw on data collected from elite interviews to illustrate the complexities of negotiating
peace, charting not only the enduring consequences of these processes, but their unintended
effects. Rather than facilitate peace, the Rwandan Arusha Accords failed to counteract the civil war
continuing and had the unintended effect of affording the political space and time for genocide
preparation. It was this, Belof and Lakin argue, that had the further unintended effect of an RPFled retightening of the domestic political arena in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide to prevent a
resurgence of extremist views. A move that has effectively eviscerated competitive party-politics
in Rwanda, which persists today. Beyond domestic politics, Belof and Lakin illustrate how the
experience of the failed Arusha Accords and genocide have broader implications for how Rwanda
engages in international politics, and particularly their involvement in regional peacekeeping
missions. Presenting a somewhat alternative understanding, the authors suggest, Rwandan state
motivation is in part driven by their own experience with genocide. In Burundi, by foregrounding
the composition of the negotiation process and, particularly the actors involved, they illustrate how
parties engaged in negotiation processes and, thereafter, are at once structurally and behaviorally
dynamic, and politically strategic. As such, in spite of the comprehensive power-sharing framework
that emerged based on multi-ethnic political inclusion and initial multi-ethnic posturing, ethnicity,
Belof and Lakin argue, continued to be salient for power holders and, particularly the ruling party
in the mid 2000s. The continued prevalence of identity-based politics gradually permitted abuses
of power and a re-emergence of varying forms of violence. Compounding this issue, the authors
suggest, has been repeated institutional failure and a failure to enforce and oversee the agreement.
Despite the Arusha Accords in Burundi having successfully ended the civil war, they have
ultimately failed to avert a continuation of direct violence and address more ingrained structural
violence.
Taken together, a major theme emanating from the contributing discussions is the way in
which some of the frames used to understand violence and contribute to peace may in fact facilitate
violence or a violent response to conflict. To that effect, the contributors of this issue form a timely
and important collective voice in the advancement of the critical agenda around how we conceive
of and thereafter seek to resolve violent conflict in Africa and elsewhere.
Laura Collins
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